MYTH OF CLIMATE SMART AGRICULTURE
(Ajay Jha, PAIRVI)
Climate change is not only an environmental issue but a defining problem
for generations to come which can slow down the pace of progress towards
sustainable development either directly or through increased exposure to
adverse impact or indirectly through erosion of the capacity to adapt. It is
estimated that developing countries will bear some 75% to 80% of the costs of
the damages caused by the changing climate. Even if global warming is limited to
2°C (which is definitely not the case as of now), the costs of adaptation for
developing countries are likely to be in the range of $ 75 billion to $ 100
billion a year in the period 2010 to 2050 (World Bank, 2009). It will have
significant bearing on the sustainable development and poverty reduction in
developing countries and their ability to attain Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) by 2015.
Globally, 1.7 billion farmers depend on agriculture, the proportion of
which is substantially large in developing and least developed countries. The
increasingly erratic climate variability and unpredictable extremes of weather
are already having adverse impacts on agriculture and food security, which will
increase. South Asia and Africa are projected to be particularly vulnerable to
these changes due to their large populations and great dependence on
agriculture for livelihoods. Majority of the developing countries and small
island states are most likely to be affected. Even with a temperature rise of
1–2°C, the IPCC predicts serious effects, including reduced crop yields in
tropical areas leading to increased risk of hunger, spread of climate-sensitive
diseases such as malaria, water stress in Africa, increased risk of floods
followed by drought and water scarcity for millions of people, inundation of
coasts and threat of stronger tropical cyclones, complete submergence of some
small island states and an increased risk of extinction of 20%–30% of all plant
and animal species.
With public spending of less than 4%, agriculture contributes 29% of
developing countries GDP and provides employment to 20% of the global and 65%
of developing countries populations. The impact on agriculture will have
profound impact on livelihoods, food production and access to food. Even without
climate change impacts, prices are expected to increase significantly as
population and income growth outstrip productivity and increase in total land
area in agriculture. Climate change will further exacerbate this trend with
wheat prices increasing by an additional 94-111% and maize by 52-55%. South
Asia, a net exporter of food, is expected to become net importer of food by
2050 in no climate change scenario and with climate change its imports are
estimated to increase by 550%. Sub Saharan Africa’s imports are expected to
increase by 270% depending on the scenario. Latin America and the Caribbean
countries would gain substantially and might turn into net exporter of cereals.[1]
Agriculture and climate change connection
It is alleged that agriculture contributes to around 12% of total GHG
emissions and it could be as high as 30% including land use changes and
deforestation. The sector is responsible for 47% of the world methane emission
and 58% of the nitrous oxide (N2O) emissions. Methane contributes of
3.3 Gt of CO2e per year through enteric fermentation in livestock,
and nitrous oxide contributes 2.8% Gt CO2e as emissions from the
soils as a result of application of nitrogen fertilizers and as nitrogen
excreted in livestock feces and urine. CO2 accounts to only a small
proportion of agricultural emissions. Agricultural soils both emit and absorb
large fluxes of CO2e resulting in small net emission of 40 Mt CO2e,
less than 1% of global anthropogenic emissions.
It is alleged that more than 75% of these emissions originate in
developing countries and can be easily mitigated through soil carbon
sequestration. That by implication means that developing countries that are
already under huge impacts of climate change brought about by the developed
world will also have to take the burden of mitigation and adaptation also. The
developing countries also have failed to see through the design that under the
pretext of agriculture and food takes the focus out of sources of emission in
the developed countries and being lured by money that mitigation in agriculture
can bring to them. While we later come back to what is being offered on the
table through rosy pictures of soil carbon sequestration to developing
countries, let us first understand the agricultural emissions in developed and
developing countries.
There is no denying the fact that majority of the agricultural emissions
come from developing countries. The argument is also being extended to show how
inefficient developing countries are in managing their agricultural emissions.
However, as a matter of fact developed countries use three times more energy in
producing one unit of food as compared to developing countries. The
agricultural emissions of developing countries are huge only because the area
of agriculture and livestock headcount in developing countries is far greater
than in developed countries, where agriculture is highly mechanized and is a
purely economic activity engaging insignificant proportion of population (less
than 1% of the population in the US is engaged in agriculture) and makes
insignificant contribution to the GDP. In absolute terms agricultural emissions
in developed countries far outstrip the emissions in developing countries. In
fact, mitigation in agriculture is being promoted by countries who have
significant proportion of their emissions coming from agricultural exports and
should be addressed first in these countries.
Agriculture in the UNFCCC and climate change
negotiations
The Convention places obligations on Parties that could directly or
indirectly affect agricultural activities. The linkage between climate change
and agriculture is addressed directly in Article 2 of the treaty which states:
“stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate
system… should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems
to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable
manner.”
Under Article 4 of the Convention, developed countries have the specific
obligation to “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the
mitigation of climate change by {…} protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas
sinks and reservoirs.” Preambular paragraph 4 of the Convention also mentions
the role and importance of sinks and reservoirs of GHGs in terrestrial
ecosystems. When formulating Party obligations, the Convention, rather than
focusing on specific mandatory obligations, focuses on general preparatory
measures, such as to:
- Promote and cooperate in the
development, application and diffusion, including transfer, of
technologies, practices and processes that control, reduce or prevent
anthropogenic emissions of GHGs in all relevant sectors including {…}
agriculture.
- Promote sustainable management, and
to promote and cooperate in the conservation and enhancement, as
appropriate, of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gasses {…} including
biomass.
- Cooperate in preparing for
adaptation to climate change; develop and elaborate appropriate and
integrated plans.
In climate change negotiations, agriculture appeared in draft decision “J” in the LCA text in Copenhagen COP
under the umbrella of article “I.b.iv” of the Bali Action Plan referred to as
“cross-sectoral approaches,” mainly promoted by the agriculture export
dominated “Umbrella Group” countries of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, supported
by Switzerland and the United States. Later on few developing countries
including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Philippines, Thailand, and Bolivia have
been participating in the debate. Saudi Arabia also remains engaged on this
issue given that oil and energy are critical elements of “cross-sectoral”
mitigation actions. In Bonn, India and African countries also engaged on this
issue, with the concern of unilateral trade measures being imposed by certain
countries in agricultural trade.
The entire focus in agriculture remained on mitigation and the LCA
adaptation chapter had only a footnote reference to agriculture linking the
sector to projects and programmes. The COP 15 at Copenhagen remained embroiled
in power politics and the three page outcome text of Copenhagen did not have
any reference to agriculture. Post CPH, responding to the call of
Copenhagen Accord (CA) to inform UNFCCC of their quantified economy wise
emission targets, 35 developing countries included agriculture in their NAMAs.
Subsequent meetings (at Tianjin and Bonn) further included texts in LCA
(mitigation in agriculture) on the proposals of G-77, Argentina and Bolivia,
and requested Subsidiary Body on Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) of
the UNFCCC to develop a Work Programme on Agriculture to study the impacts of
climate change in agriculture and come up with firm proposals on mitigation. In
the meantime a Global Research Alliance on Agricultural GHGs was launched led
by New Zealand, US and Japan also. The Cancun COP failed to push work programme
on agriculture and all the text from mitigation chapter in the LCA was dropped.
In Bangkok and Bonn inter-sessional conferences, the agenda fight also
brought back the attention on agriculture on the issue whether agriculture
should remain in the LCA or should be delegated to the SBSTA. New Zealand and
Canada proposed a direct SBSTA work program or a broader discussion in the LCA
outside of 1.b.iv, while the G-77 insisted that the framework of the Bali
Action Plan be adhered to and thus agriculture should remain under
1.b.iv. They also pushed to address agriculture within the LCA in
“additional matters” rather than under “cross-sectoral approaches” so as to
remove references to trade in previous agriculture drafts. In the end, the G-77
fought hard to keep agriculture under cross-sectoral approaches, where they
felt a general framework for cross sectoral approaches needed to be developed
balancing all sectors, including bunker fuels. New Zealand and others wanted to
launch the work program and/or deal with agriculture outside of cross-sectoral
approaches to avoid a trade discussion. They also asserted that they wanted to
address both adaptation and mitigation regarding agriculture.
As of now, agriculture is not on the SBSTA agenda but remains in “cross
sectoral approaches.” However, there are pressures from other quarters as
well. The Cancún Agreement, which form the basis of continuing negotiations,
emphasize the role of carbon markets in climate finance, paving the way for an
increase in agricultural offsets. LULUCF is being renegotiated as AFOLU to
include most of the agriculture as Agriculture, Forestry and Land Use. It is
mention worthy that under LULUCF reporting emissions from agriculture was
optional which developed countries use to their advantage by not reporting.
However, of late developing countries have shrilled the campaign on closing the
gap in the LULUCF and hence developed countries want more market based
mechanism to reduce their emissions and hence demand for including soil carbon
sequestration under market based mechanism through REDD Plus. Originally REDD
Plus allowed less than 1% carbon credits through soil carbon sequestration.
Though REDD Plus is still being negotiated World Bank and FAO have already
launched their pilot projects on soil carbon sequestration!
What’s the problem with soil carbon
sequestration?
The soil carbon sequestration is a methodology mired in inadequate
scientific knowledge, inappropriate existing data and capacity of countries to
measure soil carbon given the large diversity in different agro climatic zones,
and unsound techniques for evaluation. The technical difficulties and key
uncertainties for carbon stocks accounting were strong enough reasons to
dissuade the negotiators from including soil carbon sequestration in CDM
originally. The Kyoto Protocol had ruled that soil carbon sequestration and
avoided deforestation are not eligible for CDM credits. Now, economic and
political powers (led by the World Bank, FAO, large agribusiness, and interested
countries) are looking eagerly to rewrite the rules by expanding the
eligibility of CDM projects to soil carbon sequestration mitigation activities,
leaving aside the complexity and uncertainty of accounting for reductions in
these sectors. However, new push for mitigation in agriculture shoves off all
problems experienced and encountered till date. It is interesting to note that
pilot projects launched for soil carbon sequestration does not have any
baseline!
Climate smart agriculture and the associated
evils
The climate smart agriculture being pushed down the throats of small
farmers in the world is advocated as triple win, increased food production,
cash for poor farmers and climate resilience in farming. It sounds impressive.
However, there are no models yet to show that it can happen in the way which is
being proposed. In fact what climate smart agriculture promotes is technical
fixes in agriculture through no till conservation, increased use of GMOs and
pesticide, agrofuels, industrialization and corporatization of agriculture. The
hosts of solutions being offered have two certainties, one they will result in
substantial profits for the agribusiness TNCs and secondly, they will be
catastrophic for small farmers, which will not only be herded into large farm tracts
to facilitate climate smart agriculture, but will also completely lose their
sovereignty over seed, land, production and their autonomy to produce what they
need and want.
Let us have a look at some of the proposals on the table, which are
being proposed as a means to climate smart agriculture and sure shot formulae
for sequestration of soil carbon (carbon transactions are today a US $ 300
billion market) and cannot in any way be a solution to the crisis either in
agriculture or climate.
GM Crops: GM crops are not only dangerous for human and animal
health and environment but also greatest threats to the seed sovereignty of
small farmers. They are also increasing the danger of depleting the world’s
seed-diversity, crucially important in a climate-challenged world. Only Du Pont
has more than 40% of the patents registered for climate ready crops between
2008 to 2009. Together with Monsanto and BASF, it controls more than 66% of the
patents registered.
No till or conservation agriculture: Monsanto has been lobbying since 1998 to get
no till agriculture approved as CDM methodology. It claims that its roundup
ready products help tackle climate change, as they do not require tilling and
control weeding by heavy dousing of round up herbicides. Approval to no till
agriculture methodology will enable it to lure farmers with the dreams of
accessing carbon credits and sale of its chemicals will result in unimaginable
profits. However, it will be a sure disaster for small holders and poor
farmers, with companies falling over one another to control larger tracts of
lands.
Bio-char: Bio-char methodology is based on the premise that
applying charcoal to soils will create permanent carbon sinks and increase soil
fertility and water retention. The concept originated from the discovery of
organic carbon rich soil, or ‘terra preta’, in the Amazons. It entails huge tracts of lands being kept
fallow for centuries, requires ½ to 1 billion ha for carbon sequestration,
which would have to be uncultivated for long times to come. To have any
significant contribution in reducing agricultural emissions, the land required
is 1.5 to 3 times the area of India. Whether land can be available at such a
scale, can be taken out of critically needed food production - are huge
questions? The UN Convention for Combating Desertification has already proposed
bio-char, however, it did not find favor with many countries as it has serious
impacts on fertility of the soil, food security for the present and significant
contribution to acid rains. No biochar methodology has been approved by the CDM
board yet, but a charcoal methodology has been approved which can be easily
used by TNCs for biochar. Besides Plantar (Brazil) which initiated the proposed
methodology and has extensive Eucalyptus plantations in Brazil, and Arborgen
(South Carolina, USA), which develops genetically-engineered eucalyptus, are
likely to benefit from it in a huge way. A recent study by MISEREOR has showed
that none of the pilot projects on bio-char have been able to demonstrate any
substantial benefit, and many of them have been already abandoned by the
promoters.
Agrofuels: The CDM Board has approved (2009) a methodology
for biodiesel production from dedicated plantations on ‘degraded or degrading
land’. The definition of “degrading land” is so ambiguous that it covers almost
all agricultural land and all ecosystems. Archer Daniels Midland and Cargill
have benefitted directly and earned carbon credits. Other big biotech companies
are also eyeing benefits from this methodology. It also needs to be noted that,
with the spike in agro-fuel production in 2003-04, the amount of land
under conflict, and the no of land
conflicts – have also sharply increased. It is mostly the land belonging to the
indigenous communities and the village commons which are being targeted for
agro fuel plantations, leading to serious existential crisis for these already
threatened societies. On top of that, agro-fuels have large water foot-prints,
aggravating an already serious water crisis due to the changing climate.
Agriculture financing needs and finance
inflow from mitigation to agriculture; peanuts to peasants of the world
Large investments are required in agriculture to meet the projected
demands and sustain food security needs. Even without climate change impacts,
it is estimated that global investments of the order of US$ 9.2 billion
annually will be required by mid century (FAO, 2009). Asia accounts for the
largest share of investment (57%), with China and India alone requiring 41% of
the projected investment. Sub Saharan and East and North Africa require 23% and
Latin America requiring remaining 20%.
However, the public spending in agriculture is 4% in agricultural
economies (developing and LDCs), which has risen significantly in the aftermath
of food crises to 6%. More than 2/3rds of the investment in agriculture has
come from private sector through local investments and Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI). About US $ 14 billion has been committed to farmland and
agriculture infrastructure investment globally among more than 50 firms
Agribusiness TNCs (OECD, 2010). UN statistics show that FDI in global
agriculture production tripled between 1990-2001 to US $ 3 billion annually
from less than US41 billion. The geographical focus of the investment centered
on South America (led by Brazil) and Africa. These private investments are
being deployed focused on production of major raw crops including oilseeds,
corn, wheat and feed grains (83%), followed by in livestock production (13%).
The trend shows a definite inclination towards forcing agricultural production
to oil seeds, agro fuels and meat production. Low levels of public investment
in agriculture have resulted in inadequate development in rural infrastructure,
knowledge generation, and access to food and markets, which have kept the small
farmers trapped in poverty.
Cancun agreement committed to mobilize US$ 30 billion from 2010-2012 to
be scaled up to US$ 100 billion from 2020 onwards. There are significant
uncertainties about from where the resources will be mobilized, and how it will
be channelized. The apparent lack of money in agricultural finance has also
provided an opportunity to advocates of market based mechanisms to ask for
including agricultural mitigation in the CDM for look for new opportunities
within market based mechanisms. However, as a matter of fact, even agricultural
mitigation has awfully small money to offer to agriculture. Following financial
channels are supposed to be main sources of finance for mitigation and a also
adaptation in agriculture”
The global Environment Facility Trust Fund
(GEF): The GEF operates
the current financial mechanism of the Convention. For the period 2010–2014, a
total of US$4.25 billion has been pledged, of which about US$1.35 billion is
expected to be delivered to mitigation projects. These figures are considerably lower than the funding generated under the CDM
and the sums are expected to flow through the Green Climate Fund, the GEF Trust
Fund remains one of the largest sources of grant-based finance for mitigation.
UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol linked funds: The GEF also operates two other funds under
the Convention: the Special Climate Change Fund, which focuses mainly on
adaptation, and the Least Developed Countries Fund, which assists
least-developed countries in preparing and implementing their NAPAs. Both funds
provide adaptation funding for agriculture-related projects. Under the Kyoto
Protocol, the Adaptation Fund supports projects and program in developing
countries and is financed through a 2 percent levy on the share of proceeds
from CDM project activities. Most of the projects accepted and proposed for
funding to date have agriculture as a component.
The Green Climate Fund: The Cancun Agreements established the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as a
financial mechanism under the Convention, with the World Bank serving as an
interim trustee subject to a review three years after the fund begins
operations. It is likely that the GCF will be set up by 2012, although it
remains unclear where the resources for the GCF will come from and how much
time it will take until the GCF starts receiving and channeling these funds to
developing countries. It is also not clear to what extent the GCF will replace
the GEF as the financial operating entity under the UNFCCC. The fact that
Parties agreed that a significant share of adaptation funding will flow through
the GCF shows that they expect a stronger role for the GCF in climate funding,
at least with respect to finance for adaptation measures.
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs): NAMAs are voluntary mitigation actions by
developing countries in the context of sustainable development goals and
objectives that reduce emissions below the business-as usual baseline. Many
developing countries have listed a number of activities related to agriculture
in their NAMAs, for which they require international financial support. However, the quantum and channel of support
is indeterminable till date.
REDD+ and CDM: Though highly contentious, CDM and REDD Plus are
being renegotiated to include agriculture, if that happens some finance will be
available through this channel. However, most of them are likely to go the
countries and agribusiness companies given the fact that claiming carbon
credits is highly resource intensive and technical, and farmers and farming
communities will have minimal access to whatever finance is available.
The truth of carbon finance for farmers;
story of World Bank pilot project on soil carbon sequestration
The World Bank's flagship Biocarbon Fund project is
billed as a triple win for more food production, cash for the poor and climate
resilience. Really? The reality is that Africa's first "soil carbon"
project – which will involve 60,000 Kenyan farmers planting trees, manuring the
land, and farming in "sustainable" ways to save around 600,000 tonnes
of carbon over 20 years – also exhibits the sheer madness of the carbon
markets.
The US-based Institute for
Agriculture Trade Policy (IATP) has now analyzed the fine print and found (PDF) that the project expects
to earn $2.5m from the carbon markets. But to set it up, to employ advisers and
consultants and to monitor it will cost $1.05m. The 60,000 farmers will then
share the remaining $1.4m. This sounds good, but works out at a lowly $23.83
each over the 20 years, or just a little more that $1 per year. Moreover, they
will only earn this if they change the way they farm and record precisely what
they plant, burn and put on the land. Given that the poverty line in Kenya is
around $1 a day, the chance for Africans to earn a tiny amount a year – while
Swedish and other advisers earn massive amounts – is likely to end in tears.
Source: IATP
What happened with agriculture at Durban
The text on agriculture has remained unchanged for the last two years.
The main reason for that was African countries insistence in bring in
paragraphs on adaptation. Besides, at Cancun Argentina and Brazil supported
insertion of text on trade “measures and agriculture,” which was fiercely
opposed by New Zealand and the United States.
Looking at the extensive engagement of World Bank and FAO with African
Ministers, some movement on agriculture was anticipated at Durban. Parties
expected that taking up work programme on agriculture by SBSTA will be pushed
again. Procedurally in Durban, the negotiations on agriculture were contained
within the track on “Cooperative sectoral approaches,” and developing countries
used this tactically to keep any conversation on agriculture linked to the
broader debate about a “General Framework” for how all sectoral approaches
should be addressed. Developing countries also used the space to leverage their
text on trade, hoping some concessions as they thought developed countries will
be too keen to have an outcome on agriculture. The developed countries hoped to
take up the difference to the ministerial level talks, where they might be in
better position to influence green room negotiations. The text framed by French
Minister, after a series of meetings calls on SBSTA to consider taking up a
work programme (at its 36th session), and also calls on parties and
observer organizations to submit their opinion by 5th march 2012.
Text on agriculture agreed upon at Durban
D. Cooperative sectoral
approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance the implementation
of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention
General framework
: (68). Agrees to continue its consideration of a general
framework for cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions with
a view to adopting a decision on this matter at its eighteenth session, as
appropriate;
Agriculture :
(69). Requests the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice [SBSTA} to consider issues related to
agriculture at its thirty-sixth session, with the aim of exchanging views and
the Conference of the Parties adopting a decision on this matter at its
eighteenth session;
(70). Invites Parties and accredited observer organizations to submit to the
secretariat, by 5 March 2012, their
views on the issues referred to in paragraph 69 above;
(71). Requests the secretariat to compile submissions referred to in
paragraph 70 above by Parties into a miscellaneous document for consideration
by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice at its
thirty-sixth session.
Source: www. unfccc. int
While the decision to start a work programme on agriculture[7] was
delayed at Durban, however, what will happen further is not very unclear. The
WB, FOA, CGIR in collaboration with the US, New Zealand, Australia and also EU,
validation of soil carbon sequestration technologies as approved methodology
might not be very far. Whether SBSTA takes up a work programme has become
largely insignificant. As a matter of fact, the World Bank and the CGIAR have
already made efforts, which makes the SBSTA work programme completely
inconsequential. It is expected that pre determined outcomes of research
programme on climate change and agriculture, will be soon showcased by these
institutions. The momentum will be built up especially in Rio+20. Farmers and
Civil society organizations need a collective and substantially enhanced
strength and forum to counter these initiatives.
Small holders agriculture and CDM projects
Despite firm belief of institutions and countries pushing CDM in
agriculture, natural and small holders farmers world over have overwhelmingly
rejected CDM in agriculture as a solution to adverse impact of climate change
on agriculture and food security. Their decision is based on imperfect
functioning of markets in general and carbon markets in particular, and at the
same time ethical objections against carbon credits, which have not only failed
to have any contribution in climate stabilization but also have allowed
polluting countries to pollute more. They believe market mechanisms divert the
attention from root cause of the problem and incentivize further pollution and
climate change and are against the notion of equity and Common but
Differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities.
The African Biodiversity Network (Kenya), The Gaia Foundation (UK),
Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP), Practical Action (UK) came
out with a charter immediately before COP 17, which brought out the myth of
World Bank Climate smart agriculture project in Kenya. Their averments also
reflect the feelings and apprehensions of small holder’s farmers’ world over.
They argued:
- Carbon markets are an over-hyped,
unreliable, volatile and inequitable source of funding. In spite of
the vast volumes of money currently associated with carbon markets, only a
tiny fraction of this goes to projects on the ground. In 2009, out
of a total global carbon market volume of $144 billion, just 0.2% of this
was for project-based transactions. The remaining 99.8% was captured by
large consultants’ fees and profits for commodity speculators, who trade
carbon on international commodity markets like any other financialized
product.
- The global price of carbon is
already too low and volatile to deliver reliable finance to projects.Analysts predict that with commodity markets facing turmoil, and carbon
markets facing a likely flood of new offset products, the price of carbon
will only go down. This makes them a disastrous solution for food
sovereignty, improved rural livelihoods and the agriculture adaptation
needs of small producers.
- Given the technical challenges and
scientific uncertainties about the actual sequestration of carbon in soil,
this makes for a poor “tradable asset”. Given these uncertainties,
soil carbon offset credits are ineligible for the European Emissions
Trading Scheme – representing 97% of the global compliance market – until
at least 2020.
- Soil carbon and other agriculture offsets will not bring adequate, predictable, additional or reliable finance for adaptation or mitigation anywhere. Instead these quasi-markets will require massive public funds for pre-financing, and serve mostly to generate profits for commodity speculators in the North.
- Approval of a work programme could pave the way for costly and unproven technological fixes such as genetically modified organisms (GMOs) and other patented technologies and practices as solutions for “climate smart” agriculture. These technologies are not only prohibitively costly for developing countries, but also create new forms of corporate control over agricultural plant and animal genetic resources. Their safety is in doubt, and environmental, social and economic harm has already occurred from their use. They threaten to hinder rather than enhance agricultural adaptation to climate change.
What do farmers want?
There is considerable difference of opinion among the farmers’
organizations and civil society organizations working with farmers on the role
of agriculture in climate negotiations. While most of them, see inclusion of
agriculture only as a ploy of developed countries and agribusiness companies to
rake up profit through mitigation in agriculture and are strongly opposed to
any reference to agriculture in climate negotiations; there are others like
Beyond COPenhagen who believe that while keeping agriculture completely out of
climate negotiations might not be possible under intense pressure from umbrella
groups and campaigning by big TNCs, it would be a better approach to help set
games of the rules based on focus on adaptation, capacity building and
technology transfer for adaptation needs of small farmers. We are extremely
worried about the complete mitigation focus in agriculture. We believe that
small holders agriculture is climate smart agriculture and there is no need to
provide unnecessary techno fixes which will ensure complete hegemonization of
agriculture by agriculture TNCs. We are extremely convinced that farming
communities do have sufficient resilience against climate change and in the
absence of which agriculture would have been in complete disarray given the
impacts on agriculture. We strongly believe that much of the desired investment
in agricultural adaptation will have to be come from public finance. Private
investment in agriculture will be motivated by controlling and monopolizing
agriculture in developing countries at the hands of big agribusiness TNCS and
it shall have to be tailored by national governments to suit the needs of
agriculture and farmers. The current debate on agriculture in climate
negotiations offering technological fixes not only do not offer credible
solution to the multiple crises of climate change, agriculture and food, but
will definitely accentuate the crises. The international climate change
negotiations are influencing national policies and especially agricultural
policies to follow the international prescription, which is highly dangerous.
The climate negotiators must make a distinction between highly industrialized
high input western agriculture and low input sustainable agriculture in
developing countries and mitigation in agriculture, if at all has to begin in
countries with high emissions in absolute terms. The developing countries need
to understand that climate change and agricultural solutions will have to be
small farmer friendly, which are in dire need to adaptation support without
being further burdened by mitigation. Sustaining small farmer’s agriculture in
developing countries can only sustain economic growth with equity and food
production and security, and mitigate climate change.
[1]
Addressing Agriculture in Climate change Negotiations, A Scoping Report,
Meridian Institute, 2011
[2]
Turning farms into carbon sinks; agriculture and the COP 16 in Cancun, Joanna
Cabello, GIZ, January 2011
[3]
Biochar-a climate smart solution, Almuth
Ernsting, MISEREOR, July 2011
[4]
UNFCCC.
http://unfccc.int/press/news_room/newsletter/items/5563.php
[5]
World Bank. Making the most of public finance for low‐carbon growth. 2009,
[6]
http://www.adaptation-fund.org/node/794
[7]
Work program, is supposedly a series of technical papers,
workshops, leading to legal decisions. It might include work to develop and approve
standardized methodologies to count emission reductions or carbon sequestration.
[8]
Current price of CER is approx Euro 7 per CER, while majority of the climate
finance discussion consider Euro 25 per CER as the floor price.
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